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CHAPTER 21 
Evidence 
FREDERICK A. MC DERMOTT 
§21.1. Judicial notice: Common knowledge of medical matters. It 
is of course well settled that certain elementary questions of a medical 
nature may be answered by the fact finder on the basis of common 
knowledge and experience, without the need of testimony by an expert. 
Markell v. Gahm1 presented such a situation, in which it was held 
proper to deny the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the 
issue of conscious suffering of the plaintiff's testator. 
There was testimony to the effect that after the accident in question 
the decedent tried to raise himself on both hands from the gutter into 
which he had been thrown by the collision; that he was trying to talk 
but his speech was garbled and not understandable; that he was told 
to lie quietly and thereafter was quiet; that when lifted up he mumbled 
something; that on the way to the hospital he moved and groaned; and 
that at the hospital he "sort of rolled over and tried to prevent" a 
nurse and policeman from taking his wallet. The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that "[a]lthough the case is at the verge, the jury could have 
inferred from this evidence that Markell was conscious for a time 
after the accident." 2 
On the other hand, a majority of the Court held that the absence 
of expert medical testimony was fatal to the plaintiff's case in Haggerty 
v. McCarthy.s This was an action of tort, the gravamen of which was 
the failure of the defendant surgeon to disclose to the plaintiff, after the 
defendant had operated on him in 1949 for the removal of his appen-
dix, that although the appendix had been removed to what appeared 
to be its base, there were such dense adhesions covering it that it was 
impossible to be certain. Statements to the foregoing effect appeared 
in the defendant's notes describing the operation, which were in evi-
dence. The only information which had been vouchsafed by the de-
FREDERICK A. McDERMOtT is Dean and Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law 
School and is a member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars. He is a member of 
the Boston Bar Association Committees on Civil Procedure and Legal Education. 
§21.1. 1343 Mass. 468,179 N.E.2d 587 (1962). 
2343 Mass. at 471, 179 N.E.2d at 588. The Court cited for this proposition Alden 
v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267, 273-274, 124 N.E.2d 505, 508-509 (1955), in 
which testimony by a physician as to facts somewhat more ambiguous on the issue 
was held sufficient. That case was discussed on this aspect in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §22.5. 
31962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 545, 181 N.E.2d 562. 
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fendant to the plaintiff about the operation was in answer to a question 
by the latter as to why it took so long (about two hours), to which the 
defendant replied that it had taken a long time to find the appendix. 
The plaintiff had an apparently normal recovery from that opera-
tion. Some eight years later, however, in 1957, he consulted Dr. Meyer, 
a general practitioner in Schenectady, New York, where the plaintiff 
then lived. Dr. Meyer testified that the plaintiff then presented symp-
toms which were particularly suggestive of appendicitis, but that in 
reliance on the plaintiff's report that his appendix had been removed, 
corroborated by the scar on his body from the prior operation, he 
omitted certain standard tests for appendicitis, and diagnosed the 
illness as gastro-enteritis. 
The plaintiff's increasing pain resulted in an operation by a surgeon, 
Dr. Breault, about a week later, which disclosed a large abscess of in-
fectious pus due to a ruptured appendix. The abscess was drained, but 
the appendix could not then be removed because of the widespread 
infection. Further operations were required to relieve post-operative 
difficulties caused by the infection. Dr. Breault testified to the effect 
that the abscess would not have formed and these operations would 
not have been necessary had the plaintiff's condition been discovered 
and the diseased appendix been removed before it ruptured. 
To eliminate the danger of further attacks, an elective appendectomy 
was also performed, in which the vestige of the appendix, slightly under 
one inch long, was removed. Dr. Breault also testified that it is stand-
ard appendectomy procedure to remove the appendix completely, leav-
ing no stump or vestige at the cecum. 
The opinion of the majority of the Court cut the ground out from 
under the plaintiff's case by pointing out the lack of medical testimony 
to the effect that 
even if a vestige did remain after the 1949 operation, it created a 
definable risk then regarded as sufficiently substantial by practi-
tioners in the locality so that good practice called for discussion of 
the uncertainty with the patient. This was a medical matter about 
which laymen should not guess. . .. Only upon such a showing 
would there be any basis for finding a duty of discussion with and 
disclosure to the patient. The situation called for expert guid-
ance.4 
Three members of the Court, however, did not regard expert testi-
mony as necessary, and joined in a dissenting opinion, excerpts from 
which follow: . 
If an appendix requires removal it would seem to be a corollary 
that the failure to remove the complete organ might result in sub-
sequent difficulties. . .. Even if the possibility of the need for 
further medical treatment is quite remote, I can think of no sound 
reason for not disclosing the information to the patient. 
4 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 549·550, 181 N.E.2d at 566. 
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Under the circumstances of this case, I do not believe that evi-
dence of the prevailing medical practice in the neighborhood was 
necessary to show that the defendant had a duty to disclose to the 
plaintiff his doubts as to the complete removal of the appendix. 
Even if there had been evidence that the practice was to maintain 
silence under these circumstances, this court should not be fore-
closed from imposing a duty to disclose. "Courts must in the end 
say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even 
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission." L. 
Hand, ]., in The T. ]. Hooper, 2d Cir., 60 F.2d 737, 740.5 
Ascertainment of the scope of common knowledge on any subject 
other than those which are quite obvious is a task which is particularly 
frustrating, as is illustrated by the split in the Court in the Haggerty 
case. This is understandable, since opinions in this area can ultimately 
be placed on no more demonstrably valid basis than that one "feels," 
"believes" or "thinks" that a particular proposition is or is not a matter 
of common knowledge, despite the fact that the statement of the con-
clusion is often couched in terms much more absolute. Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that reactions to decisions such as that in the 
Haggerty case are bound to be as much visceral or emotional as intel-
lectual in nature. 
However one may react to the merits of the decision, the Haggerty 
case adds another instance of a verdict directed at the close of plaintiff's 
case because of the complete absence of medical expert testimony, a 
result which in all too many cases should be a source of no satisfaction 
to anyone concerned. 
Indeed, upon understanding and reflection, many such cases must 
appear to our brethren in the medical profession to constitute a dismal 
succession of "Scotch verdicts," which establish only one proposition, 
not the professional vindication of the defendant physician's treatment 
of his complaining patient, but merely the hollow equivocation that 
whether his treatment was professionally proper or improper is not 
a matter of common knowledge.6 
§2I.2. Circumstantial evidence: Unexplained loss by bailee a prinIa 
facie case of negligence. In Bean v. Security Fur Storage Warehouse, 
Inc.,1 an action of contract or tort, the plaintiff entrusted a fur coat 
to a furrier to be cleaned and stored, for which purposes the furrier 
delivered it to the defendant. When the plaintiff requested its return, 
the defendant did not produce it. The plaintiff introduced answers of 
the defendant's president to interrogatories to the effect that the coat 
had been received from the furrier, that he did not know what had 
51962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 552-55l1, 181 N.E.2d at 567·568. 
6 For a statement of the problem and a discussion of the unfortunately restrictive 
judicial construction placed upon the attempt of the legislature to ameliorate the 
patient's predicament by the statute making learned treatises admissible in mal-
practice cases (Acts of 1949, c. 183, §I, adding G.L., c. 2l13, §79C), see Hughes, Evi-
dence §622 (1961). 
§21.2. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1179, 184 N.E.2d 64. 
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happened to the coat while it was in the defendant's possession, and 
that when the plaintiff called for it, the defendant was unable to find 
it. The defendant offered no evidence. There was a finding for the 
plaintiff. 
The plaintiff had also sued the furrier in another action, which 
was tried with the Bean case. Answers by the furrier to interrogatories 
propounded by the plaintiff in the action against the furrier were ad-
mitted in the Bean case over the defendant's exception, which was 
sustained on appeal. This decision was, of course, routine. 
A more interesting aspect of the opinion dealt with the question 
raised by the defendant's exception to the finding of liability on the 
mere showing of the unexplained loss, on which, since the case must 
be retried and the question would arise again, the Supreme Judicial 
Court indicated its views. 
The opinion first stated the general common law rule to the effect 
that in the absence of special contract, a bailee is not an insurer, and 
recovery by a bailor for failure to deliver would therefore require 
proof of negligence.2 The Court went on to say that if the substance of 
the evidence should be the same on retrial of the case, "an issue of 
fact would be presented," 3 and continued: 
While the burden of proving negligence would continue to rest 
upon the plaintiff, the receipt of the coat by the defendant and its 
disappearance while in the possession of the defendant, which 
offers no explanation of the disappearance, would permit a finding 
that the defendant was negligent.4 
This language is clearly apt to describe the effect of the evidence 
as creating an inference, which the jury mayor may not draw. It is 
certainly not consistent with a holding that its effect is that of presump-
tion or prima facie evidence, either of which, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, would require and not merely permit the finding of 
negligence. 
However, the Court was treading warily, for the opinion continues: 
Regardless of whether one uses the phrase disapproved in Hanna 
v. Shaw, 244 Mass. 57, 61, that "the fact of negligence may be pre-
sumed" (but compare Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.] §2508; Mc-
2 Citing Perrault v. Circle Club, Inc., 1126 Mass. 458, 459, 95 N.E.2d 204, 205 (1950). 
It was pointed out that the Bean case does not present the situation in which, by 
statute, the failure of a warehouseman to deliver on demand by the holder of a 
warehouse receipt throws the burden of showing a nonculpable loss as an excuse for 
non-delivery upon the warehouseman. G.L., c. 105, §15. As the Court also noted, 
the coat was delivered prior to October 1, 1958, the effective date of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, G.L., c. 106, §7-401l. 
81962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1179, 1181, 184 N.E.2d 64, 66. There would be no issue as 
to the credibility of the plaintiff's evidence, since the essential facts were established 
by admissions of the president of the defendant corporation, its agent for the pur-
pose, in answers to interrogatories, by which it appears that the defendant would be 
bound as a matter of law, in the absence of evidence more favorable to it. See 
Tighe v. Skillings, 297 Mass. 504, 9 N.E.2d 5112 (1937). 
4 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1179, 1181, 184 N.E.2d 64, 66. 
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Cormick, Evidence, p. 644), this means that the burden of going 
forward with the evidence falls upon the defendant./) 
This latter statement is the equivalent of saying merely that the 
plaintiff has in any event made out a prima facie case, which is all 
that is required to dispose of the defendant's exception to the finding 
for the plaintiff. The earlier quoted language, ascribing to the evi-
dence the effect of an inference, therefore appears to be dictum. The 
last quotation, which is the holding, is neutral on the question whether 
the effect of the evidence is that of inference, presumption or prima 
facie evidence. 
Thus, although the decision disposes of the defendant's exception 
in tliefirst trial, it leaves in doubt the views of the Court on the ques-
tion whether, on substantially the same evidence in the contemplated 
retrial (and in other cases which undoubtedly will arise on this typical 
fact situation), the fact finder mayor must find the defendant negligent, 
and is of no help in the situation where a nonculpable "explanation" 
of the non-delivery is offered.6 Earlier cases cited in the opinion do 
not squarely foreclose the question. 
Questions raised by the Bean opinion warrant comment, which will 
be hazarded, admittedly without any attempt at documentation or rec-
onciliation of the many cases on the subject. In the first place, the 
Bean case should not be read as holding that direct affirmative evidence 
that the failure to deliver is unexplained is required for the plaintiff's 
prima facie case. Ambiguity results from the commonly indiscriminate 
use of language to the effect that the plaintiff's case may be made out 
by proof of an "unexplained" failure to deliver. This involves proof 
of a negative proposition, in connection with which it is essential to 
distinguish clearly between the burden of proof and the burden of 
proceeding with evidence. 
The bailor, realistically, can ordinarily be expected to establish no 
more than a failure to redeliver as agreed. In the usual case, he has 
no way of ascertaining what happened to his property while in the 
control of the bailee, except through such "explanations" as may have 
been vouchsafed by or on behalf of the bailee before the trial, or may 
be available at the trial in the form of testimony of the bailee or his 
servants. Such pre-trial explanations may, of course, be in the form 
of admissions, which may then be put in evidence by the plaintiff, as 
was true in the Bean case, in which event no problem arises. However, 
explanatory statements adverse to the bailee made by lower-echelon 
employees may on objection be held not admissible. 
On the other hand, it may well be that such pre-trial explanations 
/) Ibid. 
6 Cf. Payne v. R. H. White Co., !l14 Mass. 6!1, 49 N.E.2d 425 (194!1), in which with 
no retrial involved, the question in a product liability action, as to the evidential 
effect of the "assumption" that the skin of the plaintiff was normal, was similarly 
left unanswered. It later was necessarily resolved in Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth 
Co., !l40 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960), which gave to it the effect of a presump-
tion only. For a comment thereon, see 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §21.!I. 
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as a bailor may receive will be ingeniously exculpatory in nature. It 
is inconceivable to hold that the bailor is bound by such self-serving 
statements, of varying degrees of credibility, and he should certainly 
not be obliged to put them into evidence either on the merits, as to 
which they are clearly hearsay and inadmissible if offered by the bailee, 
or to prove merely the fact that they were made as "explanations," 
which should be immaterial. 
Neither should he be required to attempt to prove that the failure 
to deliver is not "explained" by making the bailee or his servants the 
plaintiff's witnesses as to their explanations, thus forefeiting the right 
to impeach them.7 
It should therefore be held that the plaintiff makes out a prima facie 
case merely by proof of the naked failure to deliver as agreed, at which 
point the burden of proceeding with evidence in the nature of excul-
patory explanation shifts to the defendant.8 
As was noted, language in the Bean case "indicates" that if the 
defendant does not come forward with evidence in exculpatory ex-
planation, this posture of the case warrants an inference of negligence. 
It is suggested that it should also be held to create a gresumption, 
and thus to constitute prima facie evidence of negligence: It should 
have the effect of a presumption, so that findings on the issue of negli-
gence in cases presenting essentially the same simple unadorned facts9 
will not constitute pure lotteries. The plaintiff's prima facie case 
should have the effect of an inference as well, because the defendant 
bailee may of course come forward with exculpatory testimony in ex-
planation of the failure to deliver. If he does so, and the effect of the 
plaintiff's case is held to be that of presumption only, any such testi-
mony offered by the defendant, whether believed by the fact finder or 
not, will destroy the presumptive effect of the evidence, and with it the 
plaintiff's case.10 
Technically, the only way to permit the fact finder to hold the 
defendant negligent in the face of exculpatory testimony which is not 
believed is to ascribe to the failure to deliver (which is in fact still 
unexplained), the effect not only of presumption but of prima facie 
evidence, which upon the dissolution of its presumptive force remains 
as an inference of negligence which the fact finder mayor may not 
draw.ll 
7 See Labrie v. Midwood,273 Mass. 578,174 N.E. 214 (1931). 
8 The burden of proof of negligence on all the evidence, of course, remains on the 
plaintiff, in which respect this situation differs from those covered by the statutory 
provisions referred to in note 2 supra. 
9 Additional facts may of course make this reasoning and analysis completely in-
applicable. See the comment on Hanna v. Shaw, 244 Mass. 57, 138 N.E. 247 (1923), 
in Butler v. Bowdoin Square Garage, Inc., 329 Mass. 28, 31, 105 N.E.2d 838, 839 
(1952). 
10 See Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960). 
11 Cook v. Farm Service Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 564, 17 N.E.2d 890 (1938). Admit-
tedly, this gets us back to a lottery on the findings, which, though undesirable, ap-
pears unavoidable in this situation, under the ground rules as to burden of proof. 
In this respect the situation under discussion also differs from the cases covered 
-
6
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§2I.3. Hearsay: Statement of deceased person as fact or opinion. 
Shamgochian v. Drigotas1 was an action of tort by an administratrix 
to. recover for the conscious suffering and death of her intestate result-
ing from being struck by a motor vehicle operated by the defendant. 
The daughter of the decedent testified that she talked with him about 
three hours after his injury, and she repeated his statement to her as 
to how the accident occurred, on which facts the defendant could have 
been found to have been negligent. 
The defendant offered testimony of a police accident inspector to 
the effect that he also had talked with the decedent, about an hour 
after the accident, and that the decedent told him that he had been 
drinking at a cafe prior to the accident and that "in no way did he 
blame the driver of the truck." Over the plaintiff's objection the judge 
admitted the quoted statement. The plaintiff later also moved that the 
statement be stricken, but the judge denied the motion and found spe-
cifically that the statement of the deceased had been made in good faith 
and on his own personal knowledge. The plaintiff excepted to the 
admission of the testimony and the denial of his motion to strike. 
The testimony was apparently admitted generally and, as the Su-
preme Judicial Court held, properly so, but distinctions are in order, 
as indicated in the opinion. The statement constitutes an admission 
by the decedent, and thus would clearly be admissible against the ad-
ministratrix in the action for conscious suffering, an action brought 
on behalf of the estate. It should be noted that this is true even though 
the statement is construed as an expression of the opinion of the de-
cedent.2 
The statement by the decedent, however, would not operate as an 
admission, but would constitute hearsay in the action for wrongful 
death, to which, although it was also brought by the administratrix, 
the estate of the decedent is not a party.a The statute which renders 
the hearsay objection invalid as to certain declarations of deceased 
persons is applied only to statements of fact.4 Therefore, if the 
statement of the deceased in the Shamgochian case is an expression 01 
opinion only, it would not be covered by the statute. 
by statutory provisions referred to in note 2 supra, in that under the statutory pro-
visions, when the fact finder is not persuaded by the nonculpable explanation of the 
bailee, a finding must be made for the plaintiff bailor, because the burden of proof 
is on the bailee on the issue of explanation. 
§2l.3. 1343 Mass. 139, 177 N.E.2d 580 (1961). 
2 Hallett v. Rimer, 329 Mass. 61, 106 N.E.2d 427 (1952). 
8 GL., c. 229. An action for wrongful death is brought by the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased, but in the capacity of trustee for the next of kin. and 
not for the benefit of the estate. Beauvais v. Springfield Institute for Savings. SOli 
Mass. 1116. 20 N.E.2d 957 (19119). 
4 G.L .• c. 21111. §65: "In any action or other civil judicial proceeding. a declaration 
of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay or as private 
conversation between husband and wife. as the case may be. if the court finds that 
it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant." 
See Tafralian v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 1116 Mass. 429. 55 N:E.2d 777 (1944). 
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The Court held, however, that when, as in the Shamgochian case, 
the form of a statement leaves it doubtful whether it is one of fact or 
opinion, the trial judge must decide in which sense the declaration was 
made. Quoting from an earlier decision,5 the Court adverted to the 
rule under which a statement which is a shorthand expression of an 
elementary conclusion or inference from facts actually observed, though 
necessarily involving some element of judgment or opinion, is not 
objectionable on that ground. The trial judge could properly regard 
the statement in the Shamgochian case as falling in that category, and 
his express finding that it was made in good faith and on the personal 
knowledge of the declarant satisfied the statutory requirements. 
As a declaration of a deceased person under the statute, the state-
ment, though hearsay, would be admissible generally in both the action 
for conscious suffering and that for wrongful death. In the latter ac-
tion, as has been seen, it would also be admissible as constituting an 
admission. 
§21A. Prejudice: Failure to counteract effect of improper question. 
Murray v. Fosterl involved negligence actions for personal injury and 
property damage occasioned by a collision of two tractor-trailers. At 
the time of the accident, the tractor owned and operated by the plain-
tiffs was hauling a trailer owned by a transportation company which 
was not a party to the suit. 
An expert testified for the defendants that the amount of damage 
to the transportation company's trailer was $41.75. On cross-examina-
tion he was asked two questions as to whether he knew how much had 
been paid to the transportation company by "the Markel Service" 
(investigators for the insurer of the defendants) for the damage to its. 
trailer, to each of which questions the answer in substance was that the 
witness did not know. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs then asked the witness whether he had 
ever heard of the sum of $3000 being paid to the transportation 
company, to which, over the defendants' objection, the witness was 
permitted to answer that he had not. The defendants then moved for 
a mistrial, on which the judge ruled with the somewhat inelegant state-
ment, "Nothing doing." The defendants later unsuccessfully renewed 
their motion for a mistrial, in support of which they submitted affi-
davits, and offered testimony which was rejected, to the effect that 
nothing had even been paid to the transportation company by the 
Markel Service or the insurer. The defendants duly excepted to 
the ruling denying the motions for mistrial and to the exclusion of 
the offered testimony. 
The line of questioning was obviously improper as hearsay and 
opinion derived from res inter alios acta. Evidence of the nature 
sought by the questions would clearly be pregnant with prejudice to 
the defendants. It is true that the questioning elicited no affirmative 
II Eldridge v. Barton. 232 Mass. 183. 187. 122 N.E. 272. 273-274 (1919). 
§21.4. l!l43 Mass. 655, 180 N.E.2d 311 (1962). 
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testimony actually damaging to the defendants. However, the impli-
cation of the last question was that $3000 had been paid for damage 
to the trailer being hauled by the plaintiffs, which would have a tend-
ency to influence the jurors improperly despite the fact that the witness 
disclaimed knowledge of the imputed settlement. 
As the Supreme Judicial Court pointed out, under such circum-
stances the trial judge had two alternatives, either to declare a mistrial 
or to safeguard the rights of the defendants by an appropriate charge 
to the jury. The judge denied motions for a mistrial, and obviously 
at the time took no steps to correct the situation by appropriate in-
structions to the jury. 
The charge was not made the subject of exception, and therefore 
was not a part of the record on appeal. Under such circumstances, it 
might have been expected that the defendants would be subject to an 
opinion which would dismiss their exceptions, because the Court would 
presume that the charge had been proper and had adequately obviated 
the possible prejudicial effect on the jury. 
However, the Court more realistically held that there was evidence 
in the record which precluded the presumption that the charge had 
eliminated the prejudice: 
The charge is not in the record and there is nothing to show that 
the harm from the improper question was there overcome. The 
judge gave his imprimatur to an improper question despite re-
peated objections by the defendants. Subsequently, when counsel 
for the defendants made the oral motion for a mistrial the judge 
said, "Nothing doing." In these circumstances there is no basis for 
assuming that the judge took a different view later in the case and 
instructed the jury to disregard the implications of the improper 
question. 
There was harmful error in allowing the question and denying 
the defendants' motions for a mistrial without removing the effect 
of the improper question by an adequate statement to the jury.2 
§21.5. Parol evidence rule. Variations on the theme of the parol 
evidence rule were found as usual among the decisions of the 1962 
SURVEY year. None of the cases presented situations of any great 
novelty. However, they serve as salutary reminders of the manifold 
instances in which some facet of the rule results in the exclusion of 
evidence although it may be of great persuasive power and otherwise 
unobjectionable. 
By way of introduction to the cases, it may bear repetition that the 
parol evidence rule, often regarded merely as an evidentiary rule of 
exclusion, in reality strikes far deeper. Evidence that violates the rule 
is inadmissible because it is essentially irrelevant in the sense that the 
facts which it is offered to prove are rendered immaterial by substantive 
211411 Mass. at 660, 180 N.E.2d at 1114. 
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law policy. Therefore, even if such evidence is admitted without ob-
jection, it may not, as a matter of law, be given any effect in the decision 
of the case.1 
Joseph E. Bennett Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance CO.2 was an 
action at law upon insurance policies for a loss occasioned by acts of 
vandalism committed on a golf club swimming pool. The policies 
did not expressly include the pool in their stated coverage. Whether 
the loss was covered depended on whether the pool constituted an 
"addition" to the clubhouse, which was specifically listed. The trial 
court directed a verdict for the defendant companies on the plaintiff's 
opening. 
The pool in question was set in a lower-level concrete terrace 
connected by a flight of steps with an upper terrace also of concrete, 
running across the rear of the clubhouse, where members and guests 
of the club were served refreshments. Judicially noticing dictionary 
definitions as well as holdings in a number of cases from various juris-
dictions, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the term "addition" 
in ordinary usage unambiguously connotes a building or part of a 
building, and that the pool, while it may well be a "structure," was 
not an "addition" to the clubhouse. 
This being a suit on the policies,3 it was held that evidence as to 
negotiations between the insured and the agent for the insurance 
companies in connection with the policies, in which the plaintiff's in-
tention that the pool be covered was expressly stated, would violate 
the parol evidence rule, as tending to vary, alter or contradict the terms 
of the policies, and the statements thereof in the plaintiff's opening 
were therefore irrelevant. 
Watson v. Goldthwaite4 was a petition for instructions as to the con-
struction to be placed upon the word "issue" in a will leaving shares 
in lO percent of the income of a trust fund to two life beneficiaries, 
and "upon the death of each, his or her issue to take the deceased 
parent's share per stirpes during their lives." 
During the hearing, testimony of the attorney who had drawn the 
will was admitted over objection and exception. His testimony was 
to the effect that he had drawn an earlier will under written instructions 
from the testatrix, which provided for a similar bequest of 10 percent 
of the trust income to the same two life beneficiaries, and directed that 
on their deaths their shares should "pass on to their children." He also 
testified that the later will followed the same testamentary plan as the 
earlier will except for changes in respects not material to this proceed-
§21.5. 1 De Pasquale v. Bradlee &: McIntosh Co., 258 Mass. 488, 156 N.E. 87 (1927); 
Fairfield v. Lowry, 207 Mass. 852,96 N.E. 598 (1911). 
21962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 505, 181 N.E.2d 557, also noted in §16.1 supra. 
3 The present action, as the Court pointed out, raised the narrow issue earlier 
stated in the text, and must be distinguished from a suit to reform the policies or 
an action for failure to place insurance as agreed, in which such evidence would be 
admissible. 
41962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1305, 184 N.E.2d 840. 
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ing. In apparent reliance upon this testimony, the probate judge 
decreed that the word "issue" as used in the will meant "children." 1\ 
The Court reversed the decree, holding that because of the provision 
in the will that the issue should take "per stirpes," the meaning of 
"issue" was not limited to "children" and was to be given effect in its 
ordinary sense of all lineal descendants, but also holding that, to avoid 
violation of the rule against perpetuities, the saving construction that 
the classes of issue would close at the deaths of the respective life 
tenants should be adopted. 
The admission of the testimony as to the earlier will and the written 
instructions of the testatrix, to show an intent of the testatrix which 
would vary, alter or contradict the meaning of the will as so construed, 
was clearly a violation of the parol evidence rule. The Court held that 
it must be disregarded in ascertaining the intention of the testatrix. 
In other cases, quite flagrant violations of the rule were attempted, 
but thwarted at the trial level. In Holden v. Holden Suburban Sup-
ply CO.,8 on the question whether, under regulations of the board of 
health, the defendants were required to obtain a permit to build an 
addition to an existing cesspool to take care of its overflow, the de-
fendants unsuccessfully offered testimony by one of their number as 
to conversations he had previously had with the board regarding the 
applicability of the regulations to additions to other existing sewer 
systems. 
As the Court said, evidence of long-continued and uniform adminis-
trative practice of the responsible agency is admissible and may be of 
great weight in construing ambiguous legislation.7 In the Holden 
case, however, the Court held the regulations to be sufficiently clear 
and not ambiguous in the light of the usual construction and general 
functioning of cesspools, which it judicially noticed. It may also be 
noted that the offered testimony falls far short of establishing the 
standard of agency practice required for use as an aid in the construc-
tion of even an ambiguous provision. 
A declaratory decree was sought in S. D. Shaw &- Sons, Inc. v. Joseph 
Ruga, Inc./" on the question whether the plaintiff subcontractor was 
obligated by his written contract specifications to fill and tamp a trench 
in which he had undertaken to lay insulated pipes carrying heating 
lines. The plaintiff asked the senior engineer for the firm which pre-
pared the plans and specifications relating to the work for his opinion 
as to whether the work of filling was included in the specifications. The 
testimony was properly excluded. In this instance, the offered testi-
mony was objectionable as opinion on a matter of law, and clearly in 
violation of the parol evidence rule. 
6 The judge also. surprisingly. ruled that the classes of children of the life tenants 
closed as of the death of the testatrix. For comment, see the discussion in §2.6 
supra. 
8343 Mass. 187. 178 N.E.2d 74 (1961), also noted in §1!l.23 supra. 
7 Citing Powers's Case. 275 Mass. 515. 518,176 N.E. 621. 622 (1931). 
8343 Mass. 635,180 N.E.2d 446 (1962). 
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On the other hand, counsel improperly attempted to invoke the 
parol evidence rule to exclude testimony in Boronskis v. Texas Co.9 
The plaintiff sued in tort for negligence for damage occasioned by the 
seepage of gasoline from a broken tank located in a gasoline station 
which was owned by the defendant company but operated by a lessee. 
There was evidence that the defendant company had ample warning 
of the escaping gasoline, but failed to do anything to correct the situa-
tion. The crucial issue was whether the defendant was under a duty 
to act. 
The defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that as a 
matter of law the lease, which was neither a sham nor against public 
policy, and which provided that the lessee should maintain the prem-
ises, buildings and equipment in good repair, placed control of the 
gasoline station premises in the lessee. 
However, the lease also provided that the lessor could make neces-
sary repairs for the account of the lessee in event of the latter's failure 
to do so. There was evidence to the effect that throughout the period 
of the lease (about fourteen years) the defendant had voluntarily at-
tended to virtually all repairs without charge to the lessee, and in fact 
had procured and paid for the replacement of the old tanks with new 
ones after the damage to the property of the plaintiff for which this 
action was brought. 
The defendant argued that this evidence was violative of the parol 
evidence rule as contradicting the terms of the lease. The Court, quot-
ing what it called the settled principle that the parol evidence rule does 
not apply to third persons who are not parties to a contract, held that 
the plaintiff was not bound by the terms of the lease. It also held that 
the question was in essence the defendant's control over the defective 
tank, and that the evidence was admissible on that issue. 
The latter holding is more to the point. The issue was the actual 
control of the maintenance of the tanks during the period relevant to 
the action, and not the duty to maintain originally set up some four-
teen years earlier under the lease. The evidence properly dealt with 
conduct of the parties subsequent to the lease, which in no way tended 
to vary, alter or contradict the terms of the lease, and therefore the 
parol evidence rule did not apply. It appears that the evidence would 
be equally admissible if the same issue were to arise in an action by 
the lessee against the lessor, with no third person involved. 
§21.6. Illegally obtained evidence: Retrospective effect of Mapp v. 
Ohio. On June 19, 1961, the Supreme Court rendered its landmark 
decision in Mapp v. Ohio,! holding that evidence obtained in violation 
of the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution is by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment rendered inadmissible in state as well 
91962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 941, 183 N.E.2d 127. also noted in §1.l0 supra. 
§21.6. 1367 U.S. 643. 81 Sup. Ct. 1684.6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). 
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as federal trials.2 The Mapp decision overruled prior decisions in 
Massachusetts, in which evidence proscribed thereby, as in many other 
states, had historically been held to be admissible.s 
The rule expressed in Mapp is, of course, applicable in trials held in 
courts of the Commonwealth after the date of that decision. Thus in 
Commonwealth v. Holmes4 the facts were analyzed to determine that 
no violation of the defendant's right to be secure from unreasonable 
search or seizure was involved, the Court holding that the questioned 
evidence, a knife, had been discovered and seized in the course of a 
reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest. 
However, the retroactive effect of the Mapp decision upon cases 
tried before its date is not so clear, and this question was the subject 
of two opinions of the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1962 SURVEY 
year.1I 
Mapp was held to apply retrospectively in Commonwealth v. Spof-
ford,6 in the trial of which case the admission of obscene photographs 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment "was properly challenged 
in what might be described as optimistic anticipation of the Mapp 
decision." 7 and in which case the question was therefore before the 
Supreme Judicial Court in due course of an appeal on such exceptions. 
Dirring, Petitioner,S was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed 
shortly after the Mapp decision, attacking convictions of the petitioner 
in 1958 for illegal possession of firearms and burglarious implements 
based upon evidence including articles which had been found in the 
trunk of his automobile as a result of an illegal search. The Court 
noted that it did not appear that any motion to suppress or objection 
had been made prior to or at the trial, and that no issue as to illegally 
seized evidence had been brought before the Court on an appropriate 
appellate procedure following the trial. 
While characterizing the retrospective effect of the Mapp rule as 
"enshrouded in doubt" and "inscrutable," the Court stanchly refused 
to open the proffered Pandora's box,9 holding that the Mapp decision 
2 Overruling Wolf v. Colorado, !!8 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359,93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949), 
and extending to state trials the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, M Sup. Ct. MI, 58 L. Ed. 532 (1914). 
3 See Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N.E. II (1923), and cases cited 
therein. 
4 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1005, 183 N.E.2d 279. 
li The facts of a third case, Commonwealth v. Dougherty, M! Mass. 299, 178 
N.E.2d 584 (1961), tried before the Mapp decision, were held not to involve a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, inasmuch as the evidence objected to therein, a 
transcript of a conversation between the defendants in their cells in a police station 
overheard by microphone, was not obtained by a physical invasion of a constitu-
tionally protected place. The case is discussed in §1O.3 supra. 
6 M3 Mass. 703, 180 N.E.2d 673 (1962). 
7 Wilkins, C.]., in Dirring, Petitioner, 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1001, 1002·1003, 183 
N.E.2d 300, 301. 
S 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1001, 183 N.E.2d 300. 
9 See Eskridge v. Washington State Prison Board, 357 u.s. 214, 78 Sup. Ct. 1061, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1269 (1958). 
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was not applicable to the trial of a case tried before that decision with 
reference to which the question was raised for the first time in a peti-
tion for habeas corpus after final conviction and imprisonment.1o 
Unless the United States Supreme Court should rule otherwise, it 
would appear that the Mapp decision will be given retroactive effect 
in Massachusetts only in the limited number of cases in which, as in 
Spofford, rights thereunder had been preserved under ordinary appel-
late procedure.ll 
§21.7. Privilege: Statutory protection of communications with 
clergy. The common law did not recognize a so-called "priest-
penitent" privilege, and accordingly, lacking statutory provision, in 
Massachusetts there has been no legally required protection of matter 
divulged in a confession, either public1 or private.2 
However, legislation approved on April 24, 1962,3 amended Chapter 
233 of the General Laws by inserting therein a new Section 20A, as 
follows: 
A priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed minister of any church 
or an accredited Christian Science practitioner shall not, without 
the consent of the person making the confession, be allowed to dis-
close a confession made to him in his professional character, in the 
course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the re-
ligious body to which he belongs; nor shall a priest, rabbi or or-
dained or licensed minister of any church or an accredited Chris-
tian Science practitioner testify as to any communication made to 
him by any person in seeking religious or spiritual advice or com-
fort, or as to his advice given thereon in the course of his profes-
sional duties or in his professional character, without the consent 
of such person. 
It will be noted that the statute protects from disclosure by the 
clergyman not only confessions religiously required, but also communi-
cations made and advice given in consultation for the purpose of re-
ligious or spiritual advice or comfort. The privilege is not absolute; 
provision is made for express waiver by the individual penitent or 
consultant. 
Whether a refusal to waive the priviledge may be the subject of 
comment or inference is not spelled out. Whether the privilege, like 
that of attorney-client, is subject to being superseded on grounds of 
public policy, e.g., in a contest of an alleged will of a decedent who 
10 Cf. Guerin v. Commonwealth, !I!I7 Mass. 264, 149 N.E.2d 220 (1958), noted in 
1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.!I. 
11 This problem is also discussed in §§1O.2, 11.7 supra. 
§21.7. 1 Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (1818). 
2 See Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 338, 175 N.E. 718, 726 (19!11). 
3 Acts of 1962, c. 372. 
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had consulted a clergyman for advice on its making,4 will also have 
to await judicial decision. 
It is probable that the passage of this legislation will result in in-
creased pressure on the legislature for the protection of various other 
types of confidential communications which, although thus far not 
protected in Massachusetts, have already been made the subject of 
statutory privilege in many other states.1> 
4 Cf. Doherty v. O'Callaghan, 157 Mass. 90, 51 N.E. 726 (1892). See also Phillips 
v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 87 N.E. 755 (1909). 
I> See, generally, Hughes, Evidence §171 (1961). 
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